Abstract. While there have been a number of studies about the efficacy of methods to find exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, there has been little empirical work on finding approximate Nash equilibria. Here we provide such a study that compares a number of approximation methods and exact methods. In particular, we explore the trade-off between the quality of approximate equilibrium and the required running time to find one. We found that the existing library GAMUT, which has been the de facto standard that has been used to test exact methods, is insufficient as a test bed for approximation methods since many of its games have pure equilibria or other easy-to-find good approximate equilibria. We extend the breadth and depth of our study by including new interesting families of bimatrix games, and studying bimatrix games upto size 2000×2000. Finally, we provide new close-to-worst-case examples for the best-performing algorithms for finding approximate Nash equilibria.
Introduction
The computation of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games is one of the central topics in game theory, which has received much attention from a theoretical point of view. It has been shown that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPADcomplete [5, 3] , which implies that we are unlikely to find a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. Naturally, this has led to a line of work studying the complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria [6, 2, 19, 11, 7] .
Most of the work on approximation algorithms has focussed on additive approximations, where two different notions are used. An -Nash equilibrium requires that both players achieve an expected payoff that is within of a best response, while the stronger notion of -well supported Nash equilibrium ( -WSNE) requires that both players only place probability on strategies that are within of a best response. The current state of the art for -Nash equilibria is the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [19] , which finds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium in polynomial time, and the current state of the art of -WSNE is the algorithm of Fearnley et al. [7] , which finds a ( 2 3 − 0.00591)-WSNE in polynomial time. So far, most of the work on approximate equilibria has been theoretical in nature. The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: Are approximate equilibria relevant to the problem of solving bimatrix games in practice? To answer this, we must study several related questions.
-Firstly, how good are the algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria in practice?
If they are good enough, then there is no need for approximation. Otherwise, how much faster are the approximation algorithms?
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-Secondly, what quality of approximation do the approximation algorithms provide in practice? If the best theoretical guarantee of a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium is not beaten in practice, it is unlikely to be useful. -Finally, is there a trade off between running time and approximation? We have a wide variety of approximation algorithms, from those that solve a single linear program, to those that perform complicated gradient descent procedures. Do fast algorithms generally produce worse approximate equilibria? Should our desired quality of equilibrium impact our choice of algorithm?
Our contribution. While there have been several empirical studies on computing exact equilibria [4, 8, 15, 16] , the empirical work for approximate equilibria has so far been limited to a paper [20] that evaluates the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis (TS) [19] , and one that looks exclusively at symmetric games [12] . We address this by performing a comprehensive study of approximation algorithms. We compare the performance of five different algorithms for finding approximate equilibria on 15 different types of game. Moreover, we include two algorithms for finding exact equilibria: the Lemke-Howson algorithm and support enumeration. This allows us to answer the questions posed earlier. Firstly, we find that approximation algorithms can tackle instances that exact algorithms cannot. With a timeout of 15 minutes, we found that exact algorithms were mostly unable to solve instances of size 1000 × 1000, whereas approximation algorithms could easily tackle instances of size 2000 × 2000. Secondly, we find that approximation algorithms often perform much better than their theoretical worst case guarantees: in agreement with the experimental study of Tsaknakis et al. [20] , we find that the TS algorithm often finds 0.01-Nash equilibria or better. In answer to the third question: while our data shows that the TS algorithm clearly wins in terms of quality of approximation, it is usually the slowest, and if we only require weaker approximate equilibria, then other algorithms can find one faster.
To obtain our results, we tested the algorithms on a wide variety of games. Previous work on exact equilibria has typically used the GAMUT library [14] . However, almost all of the games provided by GAMUT have exact pure Nash equilibria, so using only these games could skew our results. For example, the work of Porter et al. [15] concluded that support enumeration typically outperforms the Lemke-Howson algorithm, based on the fact that support enumeration can quickly find the pure equilibria in the games provided by GAMUT.
There are many practical applications of game theory where all equilibria use mixed strategy profiles. Our second contribution is to define several natural classes of games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. All of our game generators and algorithm implementations are open source and freely available 1 . Our results show that algorithms perform very differently on these games, so they should be included in any future study of the practical aspects of computing equilibria.
The excellent performance of the TS algorithm raises the question of whether the upper bound of 0.3393 on the quality of approximation of this algorithm is tight. We used a genetic algorithm to search for worst-case examples, and we found a 5 × 5 bimatrix game in which the TS algorithm gives a 0.3385-Nash equilibrium, which shows that the performance guarantee is essentially tight. We applied this technique to the algorithm of Fearnley et al. [7] for finding -WSNE, which likewise had no good theoretical lower bound. However, we were only able to find an example for which the algorithm gives a 0.4799-WSNE, which is far from the upper bound of ( 2 3 − 0.00591375). Finally, to test the limits of approximation techniques, we ran the same procedure against the combination of our three best approximation algorithms (the TS algorithm, the algorithm of Bosse et al. [2] , and the best pure strategy pair). Here the fitness function was the minimum of the approximations provided by the algorithms. We found a game for which all of the algorithms gave no better than a 0.3189-Nash equilibrium, which is relatively close to the theoretical upper bound of 0.3393, and indicates that new techniques will be needed to advance the theoretical state of the art.
Related work. For exact equilibria, Porter et al. [15] use GAMUT to compare support enumeration (SE) with the Lemke-Howson (LH) algorithm. They showed that SE performs well when compared to LH, because many of the games in the library have small support equilibria. They also highlight random games and covariant games as the most challenging GAMUT games for SE and LH, which our results also confirm. Most of their experiments considered games of size 600 × 600, but they did consider random games at game sizes up to 1000 × 1000.
Sandholm at al. [16] describe four ways of solving games via mixed integer programming (MIP). Experiments were carried out games of size 150 × 150 provided by GAMUT. It was found that MIP performed better than LH but was outclassed by SE.
Codenotti et al. [4] studied of LH algorithm, on random and covariant games, where it was found that LH has a running time of O(n 7 ) for n × n covariant games. They presented a heuristic which involves running different LH paths in parallel, which showed an improvement over LH for random games, but not covariant games. They looked at games of size up to 1000 × 1000.
Tsaknakis et al. [20] performed an experimental analysis of their algorithm (TS) for finding a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. They studied games of size 100 × 100, and they also constructed games with no small support equilibria, to prevent easy solutions. It was found that TS always finds a 0.015-Nash equilibrium or better. We confirm the result that in general TS performs well, however among some of our games TS only finds a 0.14-Nash equilibrium.
Gatti et al. [8] evaluated the performance of LH, MIP and SE. They introduced a number of heuristics, and compared their performance on the games from GAMUT. They found that none of the methods was superior for all games. They did look at the quality of approximation achieved by their heuristics and algorithms, but the largest games they looked at were of size 150 × 150.
Experimental Setup
Algorithms. Now, we describe the algorithms that are studied in this paper. For the computation of exact equilibria, we study the following two algorithms.
-LH. The Lemke-Howson algorithm is a widely-used pivoting algorithm [13] . It has exponential worst case behaviour [17] , and it is PSPACE-hard to compute the equilibrium that it finds [10] . We use the implementation from [4] , modified so that degeneracy is resolved by the lexicographic minimum ratio test.
-SE. Support enumeration is brute force algorithm that, for every possible pair of supports, solves a system of linear equations to check for an equilibrium. Our implementation goes through supports from small to large cardinality.
There is a wide variety of algorithms for finding -Nash equilibria, and we have implemented the following (polynomial-time) algorithms: -Pure. This algorithm checks all pure strategy profiles and returns one that gives the best -Nash equilibrium. -DMP. This algorithm was given by Daskalakis et al. [6] . It finds a 0.5-Nash equilibrium using a very simple approach that starts with an arbitrary pure strategy, and then makes two best response queries. -BBM1. This is the first of two algorithms given by Bosse et al. [2] . It finds a 0.3819-Nash equilibrium. Given a bimatrix game (R, C), BBM1 solves the zerosum game (R−C, C −R) using linear programming. Then it proceeds in a similar manner to DMP, but uses the LP solution as the initial strategy. -BBM2. This is the second of the two algorithms given by Bosse et al. [2] . It finds a 0.3639-Nash equilibrium. It is an adaptation of BBM1 that contains some extra steps to deal with cases where the first algorithm performs poorly. -TS. This algorithm was given by Tsaknakis and Spirakis [19] . It finds a (0.3393+ δ)-Nash equilibrium, where δ is an arbitrary positive constant. The algorithm uses gradient descent over the space of mixed strategy profiles. The objective function is the quality of approximate Nash equilibrium. The algorithm finds a stationary point. If the stationary point is not a (0.3393 + δ)-Nash equilibrium, then it can be used to find a second point that is a (0.3393+δ)-Nash equilibrium.
To investigate the dependence of the algorithm on δ, we use two versions with δ = 0.2 and δ = 0.001. We refer to these as TS2 and TS001, respectively. At the end of Section 3, we analyze the effect of the choice of δ.
There has been comparatively less study of algorithms to find approximate well-supported Nash equilibria. We implemented the following two algorithms:
-KS. This algorithm was given by Kontogiannis and Spirakis, and it finds a 2 3 -WSNE [11] . The algorithm first checks all pure strategy profiles in order to determine if there is a pure 2 3 -WSNE. If not, then the algorithm solves the same zero-sum game as BBM1/BBM2, and the equilibrium of this game is a 2 3 -WSNE.
-KS+. This algorithm gives an improved approximation guarantee compared to KS [7] of ( 2 3 −0.00591). It combines the KS algorithm with two extra procedures: one that finds the best WSNE with 2 × 2 support, and one that finds the best WSNE on the supports from an equilibrium to the KS zero-sum game.
Game classes. We now describe the classes of games used in our study. In order to have a consistent meaning of approximation guarantees, all games are scaled to have payoffs in [0, 1]. Firstly, we used games provided by the GAMUT library. We used every class of games in GAMUT that could be scaled indefinitely. We eliminated the classes of games that have fixed size, and we were also forced to eliminate some classes of games because their generators either crashed or produced invalid games when asked to produce games with more than 1000 strategies per player, which included BidirectionalLEG and RandomLEG. We were left with the games shown below.
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In covariant games each pure strategy profile is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with covariance ρ. When ρ = 1 we have a coordination game and when ρ = −1 we have a zero-sum game. Previous work [15, 4] indicates that these games are easy to solve when ρ > 0, with the hardest games in the range [−0.9, −0.5]. We study 5 classes of games CovariantGame-p for p = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 where ρ = −0.1, −0.3, −0.5, −0.7, −0.9 respectively.
With the exception of covariant and random games, the other bimatrix game classes provided by GAMUT have pure equilibria, and are therefore easily solved by support enumeration. In order to broaden our study, we chose to implement generators for the following games, which generally do not have pure equilibria.
-Non-zero sum colonel Blotto Games. The players have an equal number of soldiers T that must be assigned simultaneously to n hills. Each player has a value for each hill that he receives if he assigns strictly more soldiers to the hill than his opponent (ties are broken uniformly at random.) Each player's payoff is the sum of the value of the hills won by that player. To avoid pure equilibria, the hill values are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with covariance of ρ > 0. In our experiments, we study families of games with n = 3, 4 and ρ = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, which we denote by Blotto-n-p for p = 5, 7, 9, respectively. The number of soldiers T was varied in order to generate a scalable family of games. -Ranking Games [9] . Each player chooses an effort level with an associated cost and score. A prize is given to the player with the higher score, or is split in the case of a tie. The payoff of a player is the value of the prize minus the cost of the effort. We generated scores and costs as increasing step functions of effort with random step sizes. We denote these games by Ranking. -SGC games. Sandholm et al. [16] also noted that most GAMUT games have small support equilibria. They introduced a family of games where, in all equilibria, both players use half of their actions. We denote their games as SGC. In these game the only equilibrium in a (2k − 1) × (k − 1) game has support sizes k for both players, which makes these games hard for support enumeration. -Tournament Games [1] . Starting with a random tournament, an asymmetric bipartite graph is constructed where one side corresponds to the nodes of the tournament, and the other corresponds to subsets of nodes. The bipartite graph is transformed into a win-lose game where the actions of each player are the nodes on their side of the graph. We denote these games as Tournament. -Unit Vector Games (UVG) [18] . The payoffs for the column player are chosen randomly from the range [0, 1], but for the row player each column j contains exactly one 1 payoff with the rest being 0. In order to avoid pure equilibria, we generated these games by placing the 1s uniformly at random in the rows that do not generate a pure equilibrium. We denote these games as Unit.
Some of these games are not square. So, in our results we use instances that have roughly the same name number of payoffs as the corresponding square games, e.g., we compare 100 × 100 games to non-square games with roughly 10000 payoff entries.
Unlike other studies [8, 16] , we do not include the exponential-time examples for LH devised by Savani and von Stengel [17] . They are not suitable for an experimental study on approximate equilibria because the games have a number of large payoffs, so when they are normalised to the range [0, 1], almost all payoffs in the game are close to 0. Hence these games are very easy to approximate. For example, the 30 × 30 instance has a pure 1.63 × 10 −10 -WSNE. Furthermore, for instances larger than 16×16, these games exhaust the precision of floating point.
Implementation details. All implementations are written in C. We used CPLEX to solve the linear programs used in some of the algorithms. For our runtime results, we only measured the amount of time spent by the solver, and discarded the time taken to read the game from its input file. Our experiments were carried out on a cluster of 8 identical machines running Scientific Linux 6.6, which each have an Intel Core i5-2500k processor clocked at 3.30GHz with 16GB of RAM.
To verify our results, we implemented three programs that compute the quality of exact, approximate, and well-supported Nash equilibria, respectively. All of these programs carry out their calculations in exact arithmetic. Our exact equilibrium checker takes a pair of supports, and checks whether there exists a Nash equilibrium on these supports. Both of the approximate checkers take a mixed strategy profile, and output the value of that this profile achieves.
Experimental Results
Exact Algorithms. We tested LH and SE against our library of games with a timeout of 15 minutes. Table 1 part A shows the percentage of games that were solved by these two algorithms for various game sizes. We have divided the games into three classes. Firstly we have GAMUT games that always have pure equilibria. As expected, SE performs well on these games, while LH is also able to tackle the majority of instances. Secondly, we have the GAMUT games that do not always have pure equilibria. Both algorithms performed very poorly for covariant games, which is in agreement with previous studies. Finally, we have the games that we proposed. Both algorithms struggle with the games in this class, which supports the idea that GAMUT's existing library does not give a comprehensive picture of possible games. Ranking games provide an interesting case that differentiates between LH and SE: these games only had equilibria with medium sized support so SE was hopeless, however LH was able to solve these games using a linear number of pivots. In conclusion, our results show that exact methods are inadequate for the 2nd and 3rd classes of games, so it is for these games that we are interested in the performance of approximation methods.
Approximation algorithms. Table 1 part B shows the running time and quality of approximation, respectively, when the algorithms were tested on games of size 2000 × 2000. Again, there is a clear split in the data between the "easy" games from GAMUT and the more challenging game classes. Note that, with only a handful of exceptions, the approximation algorithms were easily able to deal with games of this size. Only TS001 was observed to time out, and it timed out on 17% of the instances that it was tested on. This indicates that approximation algorithms can indeed be applied to games that cannot be tackled with exact methods. We summarize the performance of the algorithms as follows. -DMP. This algorithm runs quickly and usually gives a poor approximation. In terms of quality, it is clearly outmatched by all of the other algorithms. -BBM1 and BBM2. These algorithms were typically in the middle in terms of both approximation quality and running time. Only a handful of Blotto instances triggered the extra steps in BBM2, so these two algorithm are mostly identical. -Pure. Whenever the game has a pure NE, this algorithm performs well, because it terminates once a pure NE has been found. Otherwise, it is among the slowest of the algorithms, because it is never faster than n 3 , where n is the number of strategies. The quality of approximation results confirm that our new games succeed in avoiding pure strategy profiles that are close to being Nash equilibria.
-TS2 and TS001. The TS algorithm was the clear winner in terms of quality of approximation. The results show that the choice of δ can have a significant effect on the algorithm's characteristics. TS2 often terminates in a reasonable running time when compared to BBM, and it usually beats BBM significantly on quality of approximation. However, TS001 always beats TS2 in quality of approximation, and always provides the best approximations among all of the algorithms that we studied. This accuracy comes at the cost of speed, as there are many games upon which TS001 is slower than TS2. Table 1 shows the results for the WSNE algorithms on the same set of games. Due to its O(n 4 ) running time, we found that that KS+ timed out on all instances, so results for this algorithm are omitted. Recall that KS uses a preprocessing step to search for pure WSNE, and then solves an LP. We found that the preprocessing almost always provides the better approximation, but the search over pure strategies is the dominant component of KS's running time. So, there is a significant cost for targeting -WSNE over -Nash equilibria, since Pure is the slowest algorithm for -Nash equilibria, and KS is never faster than Pure. Finally, we comment on the trade off between running time and quality of approximation. In Figure 1 we plot these two metrics against each other for CovariantGame-9 and Ranking, which provide a fairly representative sample of the results that we observed across the dataset. The points towards the lower left of the diagrams are those that minimize the running time for a given approximation guarantee. In order of accuracy, we typically see points from DMP, BBM1, TS2, and TS001 along this frontier.
The TS algorithm. Since our results indicate that the TS algorithm gives the best approximations, it is worth spending more time analysing this algorithm. Both the quality of approximation and the running time of the algorithm are affected by the choice of δ. We now give more detailed results on how this parameter affects the of the algorithm. To test the dependence on δ, we ran the TS algorithm on one hundred 400 × 400 instances of RandomGame for various values of δ in the range (0, 0.14]. The results of these experiments are displayed in Figure 2 . The left side of the figure shows the results for a single game, while the right side of the figure shows the average results over all instances.
The first two rows show the runtime and quality of approximation, respectively. It can be seen that the algorithm does not scale smoothly with respect to δ, and instead there are discontinuities in both running time and quality of approximation. The explanation for these discontinuities can be found in the third and fourth rows, which show the number of rows and the size of the LP that is solved in each iteration, respectively. The third row shows that, as we would expect, the number of iterations increases as δ decreases. However, the data in the fourth row shows that the story is more complicated. The size of the LP that is formulated in each iteration increases as δ increases. Thus, although the number of iterations falls, the time per iteration gets larger.
Worst case examples
The best theoretical upper bound on the performance of the TS algorithm is that it produces a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium, but previous work has not been able to show a matching lower bound. As we have seen, the algorithm usually finds a very good approximation in practice. The Blotto games were the only class that challenged the algorithm, and even then the approximations were usually good. Figure 3 shows box and whisker plots for the quality of approximation of TS001 on the Blotto games that we considered. Almost all points were close to 0.01, and only a handful of instances were larger. The worst approximation that we found was a 0.14-Nash equilibrium, which is still far from the worst-case guarantee.
To test the limits of the TS algorithm, we used a genetic algorithm to try and find worst-case examples. More precisely, we used a genome that encoded a 5 × 5 game, and a fitness function that measured the quality of approximation found by TS001 on the game. The result of this was a 5 × 5 game 2 for which TS001 produces a 0.3385-Nash equilibrium. Note that this essentially matches the theoretical upper bound.
Although this example provides a good lower bound against TS001, we found that BBM2 produced a 0.024-NE when applied to this instance. For this reason, we decided to test the limits of our entire portfolio of algorithms. We used the same genetic algorithm, but this time the fitness function was the best of the approximations found by TS001, Pure, and BBM2. We produced a 5 × 5 game for which all of the above algorithms produced at best a 0.3189-Nash equilibrium (TS produced a 0.3189-NE, Pure produced a 0.324-NE, and BBM2 produced a 0.321-NE.) Both of the games mentioned so far contain dominated strategies. While this does not invalidate the lower bounds, it is obviously undesirable. For this reason, we reran the experiments with a fitness function that penalizes dominated strategies. For TS, we found a game with no dominated strategies for which the algorithm produces a 0.3254-NE, and for the portfolio we found a game with no dominated strategies for which the portfolio finds a 0.3253-NE.
Finally, we applied the genetic algorithm to try and find a worst case example for KS+, but we were unsuccessful. We were able to produce a 5 × 5 game for which KS+ finds a 0.4799-WSNE, but this is not particularly useful, as some of the techniques used in this algorithm cannot possibly find an -WSNE where is better 0.5.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have conducted experiments to test the applicability of approximation methods in practice. We found that the existing library of games provided by GAMUT is biased towards games that always have pure Nash equilibria, so we introduced several new classes of games where this is not the case. Having done so, we are able to give conclusive answers to the questions that we posed in the introduction. Firstly, we have seen that the exact algorithms LH and SE are quite limited in their ability to solve large games, particularly on the games that we have introduced. Secondly, in contrast to this, we have seen that approximation methods can tackle much larger instances, and that they provide approximate equilibria that are good enough to be practically useful. Finally, we have seen that DMP, BBM, and the variations of TS, can all be useful depending on the quality of approximation that is required, which shows that there is a trade-off between running time and quality of approximation. In addition to this, we have also applied genetic algorithms to find a new worst case-example for TS which essentially match the theoretical upper bound.
This work has highlighted the need for a comprehensive library of games upon which game theoretic algorithms can be tested. In addition to the games that we have introduced, there are also a number of other areas that could be represented here. For example, there are many auction problems from which games could be derived. Our study has focussed on algorithms with provable guarantees on the quality of approximate equilibria found in polynomial time. One direction for further study would to be to consider exact algorithms as heuristics for finding approximate equilibria. For example, one could randomly sample supports and find the best approximate equilibria on these supports using linear programming, or one could run an algorithm like LH for a fixed time or number of steps and check how good the strategy profiles it traces are as approximate equilibria. It would be interesting to see the extent that genetic algorithms can be applied to this. For example, what happens when we try to make LH bad, for quality of approximation or for running time? For approximation results, we would be
